Abstract. As a practical method, the passive scheme has been used to analyze the security of an untrusted source in quantum key distribution. In the passive scheme, one can utilize average-photon-number (APN) monitor, photon-number-distribution (PND) monitor and photon-number analyzer (PNA) to achieve the unconditional security with using BB84 protocol or decoy-state protocol. In this paper, the ClopperPearson confidence interval is estimated to analyze the statistical fluctuation due to finite number of measurements. Two cases of independent additive detection noise, i.e., Poissonian and Gaussian noise, are considered and discussed in the passive scheme, respectively. Our analysis can be directly applied in the "Plug & Play" QKD system.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to generate a secret key by a quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . The well-known single-photon BB84 protocol [1] for an ideal QKD system has been proved to be unconditionally secure in the last decade [7, 8, 9] . Furthermore, an ILM-GLLP security proof of practical QKD system has been given if imperfect single-photon source, channel and detection are applied [10, 11] . In the ILM-GLLP security analysis, the photon-number distribution (PND) of source, such as the Poissonian distribution of weak laser pulse, is assumed to be fixed and known to Alice and Bob, and Eve can not control and change the PND in Alice's side. This kind of photon source is defined as "trusted source" [seeing Fig. 1(a) ]. Because of the lossy quantum channel and the multi-photon-states of the trusted source, without causing any disturbances, Eve can perform the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [12, 13, 14] and obtain full information from the part of key generated with the multi-photon states. Thus, all the losses and errors are pessimistically assumed from the single-photon state of the trusted source and the secure key rate of QKD is limited. For example, for the trusted source of Poissonian statistics, a secure key rate of order O(η 2 t ) can be delivered by applying the BB84 protocol, where η t is the transmission efficiency of quantum channel [13] . Fortunately, with the decoy states [15, 16, 17] , Alice randomly sends the different PND pulses and the properties of the quantum channel are characterized by Alice and Bob and higher secure key rate is achieved of order O(η t ) [5] . The decoy-state method for the trusted source has been successfully implemented in recent QKD experiments by employing the Poissonian distributed laser pulses with different mean photon numbers [18, 19, 20, 21, 22] .
Recently, it was found that the characteristics of source need to be verified in a reallife QKD experiment [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] . The assumption of trusted source does not always hold in the QKD systems, especially in the round-way "Plug & Play" system [31] . Actually, in the system, Bob sends to Alice a train of bright laser pulses which can be eavesdropped and manipulated by Eve. After receiving these pulses, Alice attenuates them to the weak signals which are encoded and reflected back to Bob (and/or Eve). Even though Alice can use a time-domain filter, frequency-domain filter and phase randomizer [32] to assure the mixture of single-mode Fork states [23, 27, 28] , the PND of classical mixed states can be under Eve's control. Here, it is supposed that Eve has the power to implement quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement [33] and she can know the photon number of each pulse sent to Alice's station. This kind of photon source is defined as "untrusted source" [seeing Fig. 1(b) ] [27, 28, 29, 30] . Note that Alice's filters, phase randomizer and encoder should exist in Alice's side, but they are not shown in Fig. 1(b) . Through QND in Fig. 1(b) , Eve knows the exact photon number at position 1, which may assist her PNS attack at position 2 [27] . For applying the BB84 protocol, experimentally, the average-photon-number (APN) monitor for an untrusted source has been proposed [31] . For keeping GLLP's or decoy-state analysis applied efficiently for the untrusted source, theoretically, the active scheme of the photon-number analyzer (PNA) has been put forward [27] . In recent work, the passive scheme and the detectordecoy scheme have been proposed to monitor the PND of untrusted source [28, 29] . As a simple and practical method, experimentally, the passive scheme for PND monitor and PNA has been tested and seems more applicable in the practical QKD system [28, 30] . In this paper, with using the passive scheme and performing the different detection mode and post-processing, the APN monitor, PND monitor and PNA are presented to resolve the untrusted source problem in details. In the security analysis, the practical issues, such as finite number of measurements and detection noise, are quantitatively discussed. The Clopper-Pearson confidence interval is used to estimate the statistical fluctuation due to finite number of measurements. Two cases of detection noise, such as dark counts and Gaussian electronic noise, are considered. Through two different passive schemes, PND monitor at position 1 or 2 in Fig. 1(b) is implemented and addressed, respectively. To simplify the analysis, both of APN monitor and PND monitor are based on the GLLP analysis for the BB84 protocol throughout the paper. The results of PNA can be applied in the BB84 protocol or decoy-state protocol [27] .
The security analysis of untrusted source with APN monitor
A passive scheme is demonstrated in Fig. 2 . In the section, the detector in this passive scheme is limited to monitor the APN µ of untrusted source and then uses an attenuator (transmission efficiency: λ) to insure the weak pulses with the fixed average photon number (such as 0.1). This simple intensity monitor had been implemented to a practical "Plug & Play" system [31] . With applying the BB84 protocol without the decoy states, the security analysis of untrusted source is presented below. For convenience, in the following discussion, Pi with i = 1, · · ·, refers to the position i.
In Fig. 2 , the photon-number distribution D(m) at P4 and P (n 2 ) at P2 are the Figure 2 . The passive scheme using a beam splitter (BS, transmission: t B ), a detector (detection efficiency: t D ), an attenuator (transmission efficiency: λ) and an encoder. Here, the inefficient detector is modeled by a virtual attenuator between P3 and P4 (transmission efficiency: t D ) and an ideal detector (100% detection efficiency). The encoder is used for the standard phase coding.
Bernoulli transformation of P (n 1 ) at P1, that is
Here, h m,n 1 =
, ξ = t B t D and the detector has the detection efficiency t D . In practice, the intensity monitor of detector only gives m = ∞ m=0 mD(m). However, based on Eq. (1), µ = n 1 = m /ξ and can be known if both m and ξ are known. Then, from Eq. (2), the APN n 2 = ηµ at P2 can also be deduced. From the work of GLLP [11] and BLMS [13] , it is important for Alice to estimate the upper (low) bound of multi-photon (single-photon) probability emitted from the untrusted source at P2 of Fig. 2 . For the untrusted source only under Alice's APN monitor, Eve can arbitrarily manipulate the PND P (n 1 ) at P1 of Fig. 2 with constrains of ∞ n 1 =0 n 1 P (n 1 ) = µ and ∞ n 1 =0 P (n 1 ) = 1. Eve chooses the optimal P (n 1 ) to maximize the multi-photon probability at P2 for eavesdropping more information by PNS attack. Alice has to estimate the worst case and the upper bound of the multiphoton probability is estimated at P2. The multi-photon probability at P2 is
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where
. Thus, to estimate the worst case, one needs to solve the convex optimization [34] or linear program (LP) problem which has the form minimize − c T x,
For example, if η = 0.001 and µ = 100, the LP problem can be solved by using Simplex Method [35] and the maximum value P n 2 >1 of c T x is 0.02984916 when x = 0.94425864 0 ... 0 0.05574136 0 ...
T
. In this example, to Eve, the optimal PND of untrusted source is P (n 1 = 0) = 1 − µ/1794, P (n 1 = 1794) = µ/1794 and P (n 1 = 0, 1794) = 0. From the analysis of Simplex Method, one can get the maximum value of a i /i (i ≥ 2) rightly at n 1 = 1794. Generally, the optimal PND of untrusted source has the form of P (n 1 = 0) = 1 − P (n 1 = k η ), P (n 1 = k η ) and P (n 1 = 0, k η ) = 0. Here, a i (η)/i (i ≥ 2) gets the maximum value at i = k η . Then, we get
When η changes to other values (but ηµ is fixed), P n 2 >1 decreases as η gets smaller [seeing Fig. 3 ]. Thus, for the APN monitor of the untrusted source, more attenuation in Alice's side can decrease the multi-photon pulses emitted from Alice to Bob. For an error-free setup with Bob's perfect detection (100% detection efficiency and no dark counts), the necessary condition for security is [13] 
where Q exp is the total expected probability of detection events, ∆ is the upper bound of tagged signal probability [11] . Otherwise, Eve can suppress the single-photon signals completely and obtain full information on the multi-photon signals. In the "Plug & Play" system, the expected photon source entering Alice's side is Poissonian with the average photon number µ, which means Q exp = 1 − e −µηηt . Here, η t = 10 −αL/10 is the transmission efficiency of communication fiber with the loss α (typical value for 1550 nm: 0.21 dB/km) and the length L. With the parameters of µ = 100, η = 0.001, α = 0.21 and P n 2 >1 = 0.02984916, by Eq. (7), the secure transmission distance L < 24.7 km. Note that, in the same setup, if Alice successfully monitors the PND of untrusted source and Eve does not replace the Poissonian source, the secure transmission distance L < 63 km. Generally, for a practical "Plug & Play" setup with quantum bits error rate (QBER) E exp , the secure key rate for untrusted source with APN monitor can be given as
where f (E exp )H 2 (E exp ) is the leakage information in the error correction and
is the binary entropy function. APN monitor does not require high detector resolution. In the experiment, an optical power meter records the time average of total optical pulses energy during one fixed period and is commonly used to monitor average optical power or APN m . Due to finite average time, the measured values of power meter may statistically fluctuate between the different periods. Thus, one of records from the power meter can not represent the real m unless it has infinite average time. However, when the running time of QKD system is much longer than the average time of power meter and large number of records from the power meter have been obtained, approximately, the mean of these records obeys the normal distribution in the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [36] . Trough the mean and variance of these records, the real m can be statistically estimated in an interval [ m L , m U ] with a confidence level [36] . Further, with the same
The security analysis of untrusted source with PND monitor at P1
Through the reconstruction algorithm, the passive scheme Fig. 2 can also be used to obtain the information of the photon-number distribution P (n 1 ) at P1 from the detector's data at P4. For applying BB84 protocol, one needs to estimate the upper bound of P (n 2 > 1), i.e, P n 2 >1 .
Photon-number-resolving (PNR) detector without noise
Here, in Fig. 2 , the ideal detector is supposed of photon-number-resolving power. Many efforts have been paid to develop the PNR detectors including the visible light photon counter [37] , fiber-loop detectors [38, 39, 40, 41] , superconducting transition edge sensors [42] , superconducting nanowire detector [43, 44] , quantum dots [45] , on-off detector [46] and hyprid photo-detector [47, 48] . For clarifying the problem, here, the noise of PNR detector is not considered. Thus, only the finiteness of measurements for D(m) has some statistical effects on inverting P (n 1 ). Let the total number of measurements be M and the variable X m (m = 0, 1, ...) means the X m measurements finding m photons. If M ∞, the relative frequency D(m) = X m /M will fluctuate around the true D(m), which inevitably impacts on obtaining the true P (n 1 ).
3.1.1. Inverse-Bernoulli-Transformation Algorithm Based on Eq. (1), mathematically, P (n 1 ) can be reconstructed by the inverse Bernoulli transformation of D(m) [49, 50] . Thus,
When ξ > 0.5, the P (n 1 ) distribution can be efficiently recovered from D(m) [49] .
For numerically simulating Eq. (9) in a real computer, firstly, the photon-number cutoff for P (n 1 ) or D(m) needs be carefully considered according to the practical situation. [51, 52] ) Let X be the number of successes in M Bernoulli trials with probability p of success on each trial. The ClopperPearson (1 − α) confidence interval for p is obtained as follows: if X = x is observed, then the lower and upper bounds p l (x, α) and p u (x, α), respectively, are defined by
Lemma 1. (Clopper-Pearson Confidence Interval
In practice, after the M measurements of D(m), one can find a cutoff m c above which no clicks happen. Among the M repeating measurements, the event of finding photons m > m c subjects to the Bernoulli distribution with probability of p = m>mc D(m). According to Lemma. 1,
where 
where the last inequality used the properties of
with the confidence level 1 − α. M and ξ should be chosen to determine a small probability P (n 1 > m c ) with a high confidence level. Thus, seeing Eq. (3), the multi-photon probability from the n 1 >mc a n 1 P (n 1 ) (0 ≤ a n 1 ≤ 1) or truncation error will be less than [1 − (α/2) 1/M ]/ξ mc+1 . On another side, to Eq. (9), the function g m,n 1 oscillates between the negative value and positive value because of the negative value of 1 − ξ −1 . The amplitude of oscillation becomes large when ξ decreases and m n increases. When the inverse Bernoulli transformation is simulated in a computer, the precision for computing g m,n 1 is highly required when the oscillation changes sharply. Otherwise, the probability distribution function (PDF) P (n 1 ) may yield the unphysical result and the errors of inverted P (n 1 ) becomes large.
On the conditions of enough computer precision and appropriate photon-number cutoff, we can discuss the statistical error of inverting the truncated P ′ (n 1 ) from measuring the truncated D ′ (m). The set of variables X m obeys the multinomial distribution [49] 
where a frequency histogram k m specifies in how many runs the outcome was found in a mth bin and satisfies 
and
Let the set of variable P (n 1 ) satisfies
Thus, the set of P (n 1 ) will also obey the multidimensional normal distribution N (P, V ′ ), where
Observing Eqs. (17) and (18), by the transformation matrix G, the small statistical errors from D(m) may be amplified and propagated to P (n 1 ) which largely fluctuates around P ′ (n 1 ). Here, both D ′ (m) and P ′ (n 1 ) are regarded as the unknown parameters. Thus, the mc m=n 1 g m,n 1 k m /M may largely deviates from P ′ (n 1 ) and yield unphysical result which fails to be applied in Eq. (3). The statistical uncertainty is reduced only by increasing the measurement number M.
Maximum-likelihood (ML) algorithm
After the photon-number truncation of P (n 1 ), without using Eq. (9), one can use Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation to reconstruct the truncated PND P ′ (n 1 ) though the measured k m [53, 54, 44] . ML algorithm can avoid yielding the unphysical results in the computing procedure. Based on the multinomial distribution Eq. (14) and given a practical histogram {k m }, the ML method can estimate the most likely {P ′ (n 1 ), n 1 = 0, ..., m c } to maximize the probability
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with constraints of P ′ (n 1 ) ≥ 0, (n 1 = 0, ..., m c ) and
Basically, after fixing the {k m }, it is also a linear program problem to find the optimal {P ′ (n 1 )} to maximize the ML function with some constraints. One can also use the method developed in [44, 53, 54] to resolve the problem. This is done by resolving m c + 1 nonlinear equations
The above set of Eq. (22) can be solved by standard numerical methods, such as Expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [55, 56] . EM algorithm suggests an iterative procedure to find the fixed point by
where, P ′(j) (n 1 = l) means the jth iterative result of P ′ (n 1 = l). Thus, the complex problem of constrained multidimensional optimization is effectively solved with the help of a simple iterative algorithm [53] . Eq. (23) needs an initial distribution P ′(0) (n 1 ). However, the choice of the initial distribution does not alter the quality of reconstruction and only affects the convergence speed. Thus, if one has no prior information of P ′ (n 1 ), the initial uniform distribution in the range [0, m c ] can be chosen.
In the CLT, the distribution of ML estimators P ′ M L (n 1 ) tends to the normal distribution with the mean P ′ (n 1 ) and the variance σ 2 M L (n 1 ) which is governed by the Cramér-Rao (CR) bound [36, 57] . Based on the functional invariance of ML estimators, P
M L is also governed by the CR bound. Thus, for a large number of measurements,
PNR detector with random Poissonian noise and Gaussian noise
For the case of independent random detection noise with Poissonian statistics, such as the dark counts in PNR, the similar mathematical equations to Eqs. (1) and (9) are given [58, 59, 60] where the d dark counts happen with the probability e −γ γ d /d! and
where L m n 1 (x) is the generalized Laguerre polynomial and Φ(n, m; x) is the Kummer hypergeometric function. The direct solution of Eq. (25) is also unstable and sensitive to the error of measuring D(m) [60] . Recently, numerically, [60] had tried the regularization method and Landweber algorithm to reconstruct P ′ (n 1 ). The error analysis of the Landweber algorithm is complicated and beyond the scope of current paper.
For the case of independent Gaussian noise, the least-squares method had been implemented to reconstruct the truncated P ′ (n 1 ) [61, 62] . The error analysis is related to the Tikhonov regularization [62, 63] and is not discussed in the current paper.
The security analysis of untrusted source with PND monitor at P2
For PND monitor at P1 in Fig. 2 , due to the computing error, statistical error and noise, the inverted PND P (n 1 ) may largely deviate from the true P (n 1 ) which causes inaccurate estimation of the multi-photon probability P (n 2 > 1). In fact, one can avoid performing the reconstruction algorithm if the PND at P2 has been monitored. In doing so, the positions of the attenuator λ, the encoder and the beam splitter BS can be exchanged, then a revised passive scheme is shown as Fig. 4 . Importantly, in Fig. 4 , the parameter t B of BS is adjusted to satisfy ξ = t B t D = 1 − t B , by which the PND P (n 2 ) = B[P (n 6 ), (1 − t B )] at P2 will be same to that D(m) = B[P (n 6 ), t B t D ] at P4 in Fig. 4 . In the following step, for estimating P (n 2 > 1), D(m > 1) needs to be estimated by the real measured data, which is
PNR detector without noise
After M measurements, the PNR detector can count the number k m>1 of m > 1. D(m > 1) can be regarded as the unknown p in Lemma. 1 and be estimated in the confidence interval [p l (k m>1 , α), p u (k m>1 , α)] with the confidence level 1 − α. Based on Eq. (28), with the confidence level 1 − α, P n 2 >1 can be estimated by
with the confidence level 1 − α.
PNR detector with random noise
For the case of independent Poissonian-statistics noise d, the detected photon-number variable m ′ in the PNR detector, the true photon-number variable m and the noise d satisfy
where the variables m and d are independent. Thus,
where the Poissonian distribution e −γ γ d /d! represents the probability of d dark counts. Inversely,
. Substituting Eq. (32) to Eq. (28), one gets
1 − e γ + γe
Eq. (33) can be shortly rewritten as
After M measurements, the PNR detector counts
with the confidence level 1 − α, respectively. Using Bonferroni method for simultaneous Bernoulli confidence intervals [64] and Eq. (28), with the confidence level 1 − 3α, P n 2 >1 can be estimated by
α).(36)
For the case of Gaussian noise (such as AC digital electronic noise) z with the probability G(z) = (2πσ 2 )
and the probability P (m ′ ), D(m) and G(z) satisfy
Note that G(z) = G(−z) and G is an infinite dimentinal symmetric Toeplitz matrix. To find the statistical fluctuation effect from P to D, one needs to get G −1 which is the inversion of G. To avoid the error of computing G −1 , considering that
then
where the equality exists when D(2) = 1. Thus, one can use the PNR detector to count the click number k m ′ >1 of m ′ > 1. Using Lemma. 1, P n 2 >1 can be estimated by
Remark 1. Actually, instead of the PNR detector in the passive scheme Fig. 4 , a 2-photon threshold detector can be implemented without noise or with the Gaussian noise [seeing Eq. (29) or (42)] and a 3-value threshold detector, which can discriminate 0, 1 and more than one photons, can be implemented with the Poissonian noise [seeing Eq. (36)].
The security analysis of untrusted source with PNA
The passive setup as Fig. 2 can realize PNA which leads to different analysis results [27, 30] . PNA defines the "untagged bits" which photon number N falls in the preset range of [N min , N max ] at a position in Fig. 2 . After PNA finds the fraction of "untagged bits" in all of bits, the secure key rate can be deduced with or without decoy states [27] . For PNA, the detection mode is described in Fig. 5 . With using the integrator, the voltage v denotes the photon number m which are detected by detector. By outputting "1" at the same time, two high speed comparators are used to judge whether v ∈ [v 1 , v 2 ] or not. Thus, one can estimate the fraction of photon pulses which photon number m ∈ [m 1 , m 2 ] at P4 in Fig. 2 or Fig. 5 . Here, m 1 and m 2 correspond to v 1 and v 2 and can be measured in the experiment.
For PNA, the exact position of "untagged bits" needs to be defined and then the corresponding post-processing can be done. In original [27] , the position of "untagged bits" was defined at P1 in Fig. 2 . Here, the "untagged bits" are redefined as the photon pulses whose photon number n 5 ∈ [m 1 , m 2 ] at P5 in Fig. 2 . Based on the analysis of [27] , it is important for the PNA to estimate the lower probability bound of 1 − δ = m 2 n 5 =m 1 P (n 5 ) of "untagged bits". After the redefinition, it implies that the photon-number distribution P (n 5 ) has been manipulated and is completely untrusted, which only leads to overestimate Eve's power and underestimate the secret key rate.
After redefining the "untagged bits", on the hardware side of PNA, the parameter t B of BS is adjusted to satisfy ξ = t B t D = 1 − t B , by which the PND P (n 5 ) 
PNA Detection without noise
Here, the random variable R = 1 denotes that C1 and C2 output "11" otherwise R = 0. Thus, R follows the binomial distribution B (1, p) . If the detection mode in Fig. 5 has no detection noise, p = m 2 m=m 1 D(m) = 1 − δ. After M repeating measurements, let the random variable X = k means k measurements finding R = 1 and then X follows the binomial distribution B (M, p). If one finds k events output "11" from C1 and C2, according to Lemma. 1,
Thus, 1 − δ or p can be lower bounded by p l (k, α) with a confidence level 1 − α.
PNA Detection with the known and random noise
In practice, some noise exists in the detection and affects the estimation to 1−δ. Here, it is supposed that the properties of detection noise are known by Alice and independent of photon-number detection. In Fig. 5 , except the low dark-count noise d from the detector itself, the noise is mainly a kind of AC digital electronics noise z from the integrator or two comparators. Let the random variables m ′ , m and d (or z) measured photon number, true photon number and noise which satisfy Eq. (30) or Eq. (37) .
For the case of dark-count noise d of the Poissonian probability
Let
Note that b(m 2 ) ≥ b(m 1 , m 2 ). Combining Eqs. (44), (45) and (46),
then, we get
After M measurements of m ′ , if one finds k ′ events output "11" from C1 and C2, according to Lemma. 1,
. Thus, 1 − δ can be lower bounded by
with a confidence level 1 − α. For the case of Gaussian noise z of the probability distribution G(z), based on Eq. (37), one yiels
where the inequality used the properties of G(z), such as single-peak function symmetrical at zero. 
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when the upper bound is obtained in Eq. (53), {D(m), m = 0, 1...} has the structure of
Thus, we get
Similar to Eq. (50), 1 − δ can be lower bounded by
with a confidence level 1 − α.
Conclusion
In this paper, three kinds of passive schemes (APN monitor, PND monitor and PNA) are discussed to resolve the untrusted source problem. Quantitatively, the practical issue, such as finite number of measurements and random additive noise, are addressed in the security analysis. For APN monitor and PND monitor, the GLLP analysis for BB84 protocol is applied to analyze the untrusted source problem, in which, the key point is to give the upper bound of multi-photon probability at P2 in Fig. 2 or 4 , i.e., P n 2 >1 . For PNA, one needs to estimate the lower bound of redefined "untagged bits" probability, i.e., 1 − δ. To estimate the statistical effect, one can use the MATLAB program to calculate Clopper-Pearson confidence interval [p l (k, α), p u (k, α)] and then obtain P n 2 >1 or 1 − δ. To summarize, (i) The APN monitor does not require the PNR detector and is a simple method to limit Eve's power although it may obtain the higher estimation of P n 2 >1 and give the lower secure key rate.
(ii) PND monitor at P1 in Fig. 2 needs the PNR detector at P4. With this monitor, the estimated P n 2 >1 is sensitive to the computing error, statistical error and random noise through the PND reconstructing algorithm. Basically, reconstructing the PND at P1 through the detection at P4 belongs to an ill-posed inverse problem [60, 63] .
(iii) PND monitor at P2 in Fig. 4 can adopt one double threshold detector. This kind of monitor does not use the PND reconstructing algorithm and can avoid amplifying the statistical error and random-noise effect. Thus, this monitor seems more robust and applicable in practice. Comparing Eq. (29) with Eqs. (36) and (42), the random noise cause the higher estimation of P n 2 >1 and decrease the secret key rate.
(iv) PNA uses the threshold detection and has no requirement on detector resolution. Seeing Eqs. (50) and (56), the random noise causes the lower 1 − δ and leads to a lower secret key rate.
Except for PNA, the discussions of APN and PND monitor are in the frame of BB84 protocol. By replacing the parameter λ in Fig. 2 or 4 and randomly choosing the vacuum state, the signal state with λ s and the weak decoy state with λ d , the 3-intensity decoy-state protocol can be applied. The analysis of PND monitor can be easily extended to the decoy-state protocol according to the recent results [25, 26] in which the lower and upper bounds of P s (n 2 ) and P d (n 2 ) at P2 need to be estimated. The detailed discussion and results will be reported in the future.
At present, in the passive scheme, the photon number of the untrusted source is assumed to be an independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d) random variable. The security deserves to be rechecked when each pulse entering Alice's station has different PND each time or the photon number of the untrusted source evolves as a stochastic process.
